We investigate the first order predicate logic of probability and establish the game theoretic tools to prove that this language does not support unnesting of the probability operator. This is contrasted with the probabilistic propositional logic where an unnesting algorithm exists.
Introduction
Classical predicate and propositional logics and their relatives (modal and temporal logics) were long recognized as the main formal languages to express properties of systems. It was also obvious that some important properties cannot be stated in these languages. In particular statements concerning probability are entirely outside the scope of classical logic, even though they are needed when dealing with uncertainty, fault tolerance and randomized systems. Much effort was invested trying to incorporate probability into formal logic. Major contributions are [6, 8] and other papers on the subject are [12, 9, 3] ( [6] contains a good survey and analysis of previous work on predicate logic of probability). These efforts did not converge to a commonly accepted probability logic. The logic suggested in [6] is natural, but too strong; it is wildly undecidable (it is Σ 2 1 complete by [1] even for a single unary predicate). In [2] a very natural weaker logic is considered, called Logic of Probability. It allows to state that a statement ϕ has probability larger than some fixed 1 Partially supported by French-Israeli Arc-en-ciel/Keshet project No 30. 2 {beauquier,slissenko}@univ-paris12.fr 3 {joram,rabino}@math.tau.ac.il (not variable) rational number. The statement ϕ itself may again speak about probability. It seems obvious (though it is not proved) that the satisfiability problem for monadic logic of probability is far simpler than Σ 2 1 complete. Yet in spite of its naturalness and simplicity the monadic logic of probability is undecidable [2] .
Here we continue to research the expressive power of the logic of probability. In particular our aim is to show that the nested use of the probability operator can yield statements that are not expressible without the nesting. This turns out to be a non trivial question and the answer involves a new variant of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game technic [5, 7] . Variants of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games were extensively used for proof of inexpressibility both in predicate and modal logics [4, 11, 10, 13] .
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: In section 2 we define the syntax and the semantics of the logic of probability. In section 3 we show that for propositional logic the power of the probability statement is restricted: there is an unnesting procedure that replaces every formula of propositional probability logic by an equivalent formula without nested probability operators (theorem 1). In section 4 we identify a fragment of monadic predicate logic of probability that we call simple formulas. These are unnested formulas which in addition have no quantifiers inside the range of a probability operator. We define a Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game and prove in theorem 2 that this game characterizes equivalence of structures with respect to corresponding classes of simple closed formulas. We use this game characterization in section 5 where we prove theorem 3: there is a simple closed formula which is not equivalent to any unnested formula.
Logic of probability
We follow Halpern's presentation of logic of probability [8] . There, arithmetic operations on probabilities are allowed and probabilities may be variables which are quantified. In our setting, we just compare probabilities with rational constants.
We consider a vocabulary that consists of a collection Σ of predicate symbols of various arities and constant symbols. Given formulas ϕ and ψ in the logic, we allow formulas of the form Prob >q (ϕ) and Prob >q (ϕ|ψ), where q is a rational number which can be read as "the probability of ϕ is greater than q" and "the probability of ϕ under the condition ψ is greater than q" respectively.
Syntax
More formally we define the syntax as follows. The vocabulary consists of a set of deterministic predicate symbols, a set of probabilistic predicate symbols, individual deterministic constants and individual variables. We also assume that rational constants are in the vocabulary.
Formulas:
-Atomic formulas are of the form R(t 1 , . . . , t k ), where R is a (deterministic or probabilistic) predicate symbol of arity k and t 1 , . . . , t k are individuals (variables or constants).
-If ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are formulas then (ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ) and ¬ϕ 1 are formulas.
-If ϕ is a formula then ∃ x ϕ , where x is an individual variable, is a formula.
-If ϕ, ψ are formulas, and q is a rational number then Prob >q (ϕ) and Prob >q (ϕ | ψ) are formulas.
, universal quantification ∀ x are defined as usual, using disjunction, negation and existential quantifier. Expressions like Prob <q , Prob ≤q , Prob ≥q , Prob =q can be syntactically defined in terms of Prob >p , using negation and modified bounds on probability. For example, we define Prob <p (ϕ) as Prob >(1−p) (¬ϕ).
Semantics
First we recall some basic notions from probability theory.
A probability space is a triple (Ω, ∆, µ) consisting of a non empty set Ω, a σ-algebra ∆ of its subsets called the measurable sets (representing random events in probability context), and a probability measure µ : ∆ → [0, 1] (the probability of each event). The σ-algebra ∆ includes Ω itself and is closed under complementation and countable union. The probability measure µ : ∆ → [0, 1] satisfies µ(Ω) = 1 and is countably additive.
Probabilistic predicates are interpreted as random predicates. Given a domain U and a probability space (Ω, ∆, µ) a random (or stochastic) predicate P of arity k is a function from Ω × U k to Bool = {true, false} such that for any fixed u 1 , . . . , u k ∈ U the set {ω ∈ Ω : P (ω, u 1 , . . . , u k )} is measurable.
A probabilistic structure for the vocabulary described above is a tuple ( U, δ , Ω, ∆, µ , π), where -U, δ is a first-order structure with universe U, and δ assigns a relation over U of the appropriate arity to each deterministic 4 predicate symbol and assigns an element of U to each individual constant;
-Ω, ∆, µ is a probabilistic space; -π assigns to each probabilistic predicate symbol P of arity k a random predicate π(P ) :
Define a valuation ν to be a function which assigns to each individual variable an element of U.
Given a probabilistic structure M = ( U, δ , Ω, ∆, µ , π), an element ω ∈ Ω and a valuation ν we proceed by induction to associate with every formula ϕ a truth value, writing M, ν, ω |= ϕ if the value true is associated with ϕ by M, ν, ω:
. . , t k ) for a deterministic predicate symbol R of arity k and individual variables or constants
(S3) Quantifiers over individual variables and Boolean connectors are treated as usually.
(
that is iff the set of all ω for which M, ν, ω |= ϕ holds has a measure greater than q.
e. the conditional probability of ϕ under ψ is greater than q.
Remark that (S4) is a particular case of (S5) when ψ = true. The semantics is well defined only if the sets that appear in (S4) and (S5) are measurable. From now on we assume that (Countability Assumption) The domain U of probabilistic structures is countable.
The following propositions are easily proved by induction on the structure of formulas [2] 
Proposition 2.3 If all the occurrences of probabilistic predicates in a formula ϕ are in the scope of some operator
Prob then M, ν, ω 1 |= ϕ iff M, ν, ω 2 |= ϕ for every ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Ω. In particular, for any formula ψ we have M, ν, ω 1 |= Prob >q (ψ) iff M, ν, ω 2 |= Prob >q (ψ).
On nesting of probability operators for propositional logic
Our main interest lies in predicate logic. But we start by showing that for propositional logic the use of the probability operator has only restricted power; nesting one occurrence in the scope of another one does not add extra power to the language. We outline the analogue (yet simpler) syntax and semantics of the Propositional Probability Logic (henceforth PPL).
Formulas are:
• Elementary formulas are true, false or a symbol from a set V d of deterministic Boolean variables or a symbol from a set V p of probabilistic Boolean variables.
• If ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are formulas then (ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ) and ¬ϕ 1 are formulas.
• If ϕ, ψ are formulas, and q is a rational number then Prob >q (ϕ) and Prob >q (ϕ | ψ) are formulas.
Given a probability space (Ω, ∆, µ), a structure M is defined through a pair of functions
The truth value of any formula is defined inductively similarly to (S3)-(S5).
Theorem 3.1 Every PPL-formula is equivalent to an unnested formula.
Proof. We show first that if Ψ is a boolean combination of formulas A 1 , . . . , A n of PPL where A n has the form Prob >q (. . . ), and if α 0 , α 1 are obtained from Ψ replacing A n by false and true respectively, then for every formula ϕ, (1) .
This is true because for every structure M and
(the second claim is proved in a similar way).
The theorem is now proved by induction on the nesting depth of the operator Prob. We use (1) and (2) to pull out the innermost occurrences of Prob reducing the rank to one for which the induction assumption holds. ✷
Unnested formulas and their Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game
We turn next to nested and unnested closed formulas in first order predicate logic of probability. For our method to work we must be careful to require that the formulas have another property beside unnestedness. Later we will show that this extra property does not restrict us: Thus in a simple formula there is no nesting of the operator Prob and no quantifier is in the scope of the operator Prob.
Next we define two kinds of equivalence relation on the class of structures. In the first case two structures will be equivalent to each other if they cannot be distinguished by a simple formula with quantifier depth n. In the second case they will be equivalent if the spoiler (first player) has no winning strategy in an appropriate game. In particular if Duplicator is the winner then for any quantifier-free formulas ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) and ψ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) with at most k free variables the truth value of Prob <q ϕ(a 1 , . . . , a k ) ψ(a 1 , . . . , a k ) evaluated in M 0 at ω 0 equals to the value of
Definition 2 Let
A winning strategy, for either player, is a strategy which when followed, guarantees winning, no matter what the other player plays. The following theorem enables us to use Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games to prove that two structures cannot be distinguished by simple (closed) formulas with a predetermined quantifier depth n: 
Proof. We shall prove the claim by induction on n for all vocabularies simultaneously.
For n = 0 this follows from the definitions. Assume next that the claim holds for n and that Duplicator has a winning strategy in the n + 1 game. For contradiction we assume that there is a shortest simple formula of quantifier depth n + 1 that is true in one structure and not in the other. The shortest counterexample cannot be a disjunction or a negation which necessarily involves a subformula that is a counterexample. Hence there is a counterexample ∃xϕ(x) which holds (say) in M 0 at ω 0 while ∀x¬ϕ(x) holds in M 1 at ω 1 In the full paper, we will provide an example of two structures which are ≡ n -equivalent but not ≡ G n -equivalent.
The expressive power of nesting
We are almost ready to prove that there is no unnesting procedure in predicate probability logic. First a lemma: Lemma 5.1 (i) Let L be the first order predicate language (without probability) with the single unary predicate P and with no equality symbol. Let Σ be the class of all structures that have at least one element satisfying P and at least one element satisfying ¬P . Then every L-formula is equivalent over Σ to a formula without quantifiers.
(ii) Let L be the first order predicate language of probability with the single unary predicate P and with no equality symbol. Let Σ be the class of all probabilistic structures that have at least one element satisfying P and at least one element satisfying ¬P for each ω ∈ Ω. Then over Σ every unnested formula is equivalent to a simple formula.
Proof. Let ϕ be a basic formula, i.e, True, False or a conjunction of atoms and negation of atoms in which every variable occurs at most once. Then in Σ the formula ∃xϕ is equivalent to the formula ϕ with the atom P (x) (or ¬P (x)) removed, let us denote the resulting formula ϕ −x .
It
It follows that if θ is equivalent to a quantifier free formula (and therefore also ¬θ) then ∃xθ (and also ∀xθ) is equivalent to a quantifier free formula. This proves part (i). Part (ii) follows trivially from part 1. ✷
In contrast to the propositional case, nesting of probabilistic operators increases the expressive power for first-order logic. We are now ready our main result.
Theorem 5.2 No unnested formula is equivalent to
Proof. We show a slightly more general statement. Let Ψ be the formula
where 0 < θ < η < 1 and 2η = θ + 1. Then there is no unnested formula which is equivalent to Ψ. Assume that Ψ is suspected of being equivalent to some unnested formula Θ over the class Σ of all probabilistic structures that have at least one element satisfying P and at least one element satisfying ¬P for each ω ∈ Ω. By the lemma we may assume that Θ is simple. Assume now that the quantifier depth of Θ is k. We build two structures M 0 and M 1 with the same finite probability space Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 , · · · ω 2k+1 } such that (i) both M 1 and M 2 are in the class Σ, and M 1 satisfies Ψ while M 2 does not.
, so that by theorem 2 either both satisfy Θ or none of the two satisfies Θ.
Thus Ψ is not equivalent to Θ. Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent the two structures.
We assume that k ≥ 1. Both domains have 2k + 1 elements (denoted here by 0, 1, · · · , 2k). Ω has 2k + 2 elements with probability as specified on the left column. Rationals θ,η and ε are chosen so that (k + 1)ε = η − θ + ε and kε = 1 − η. Thus η − θ = 1 − η or equivalently 2η = 1 + θ, and if η = . Each horizontal line represents the domain corresponding to a particular ω i . The marking * means that the element i corresponding to this column satisfies P in the domain corresponding to this row. There are two types of elements: elements of the first type satisfy P in two of the domains and they satisfy P with probability θ. We call them θ-elements. The other elements are ε-elements which satisfy P in one domain only and their probability of satisfying P is ε. M 0 has k + 1 θ-elements and k ε-elements. M 1 has k θ-elements and k + 1 ε-elements. Note that the two structures satisfy the condition of lemma 1.
The formula Prob =θ [P (t)] holds for t = 0, ..., k in M 0 and for t = 0, ..., k−1 in M 1 . It follows that ∃ t (Prob =θ [P (t)] ∧ P (t)) holds in k + 1 lines of M 0 and only in k lines in M 1 . We conclude that the formula (1) is true on M 0 (Figure 1 ) and false on M 1 (Figure 2 ). < k and that a 1 , · · · , a i in M 0 and b 1 , · · · , b 
It remains to show that
Duplicator has a winning strategy for the kround Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game between (M 0 , ω 0 ) and (M 1 , ω 0 ). Assume that 0 ≤ i
Conclusion
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games were used to prove that nested probability statements are more expressive than unnested statement. This is a key observation when studying a language and examining its expressive power. We would have liked to sharpen the results and claim a hierarchy of languages with increasing expressive power, according to the depth of the Prob nesting. Unfortunately the particular form of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games that we used does not generalize easily to non simple formulas. This leaves open the questions:
• Is there a proper hierarchy of languages according to the depth of nested Prob operators allowed?
• What is the proper Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game to use in the analysis of probability logic?
